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service is not limited to cable programming, the Cable Act preempted only laws regarding the provision of cable services, not all cable
services generally.
Judy Koehler

Eighth Circuit Imposes Full
CERCLA Liability On Seller
Who Hid Contamination
From Purchaser
In Gopher Oil Company, Inc. v.
Union Oil Company of California,
955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the
seller of a chemical plant site was
100 percent responsible for the
environmental cleanup costs incurred by the purchaser because
the seller caused the pollution and
misrepresented the condition of
the site when selling the property.
Background
A subsidiary of Union Oil Company of California ("Union") operated a petroleum product treatment facility on a five-acre site in
Minneapolis, Minnesota from the
early 1960's until 1980. The subsidiary's normal operating procedures resulted in leaks, spills, and
the dumping of oil and industrial
chemicals. When Union decided to
sell the property in 1980, it removed some of the contaminated
soil but covered other contaminated areas with landscaping gravel.
When Gopher Oil Company
("Gopher") expressed an interest
in purchasing the site, Union representatives told Gopher of two
previous chemical spills but did
not inform Gopher that past operating procedures caused continual
leaks and dumping on the site.
During the site inspection conducted by Gopher representatives,
some soil discoloration was visible,
but much of the contaminated
ground was hidden beneath the
gravel. Although Gopher had access to Union's records, it did not
examine them.
The president of Gopher con130

tacted the Minnesota Department
of Inspections and the Minnesota
Pollution Control Authority ("the
Authority"). The Authority told
Gopher about the two major chemical spills but had no information
about other pollution problems at
that site.
Gopher purchased the site from
Union in November, 1980. The
purchase agreement stated that the
land and facilities were transferred
in an "as is" condition and that
none of the warranties made in the
agreement misstated or omitted
any material facts. After the purchase, Gopher repaired the plant
and claims to have controlled and
cleaned up any leaks or spills.
Three years after the purchase,
the Authority ordered an investigation, which revealed that the site
still contained substantial pollution. Under a compliance agreement with the Authority, Gopher
spent $423,272.81 in cleanup
costs.
In January, 1988, Gopher sued
Union in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking damages for fraud and
recovery of its cleanup costs under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. 9607, 9613 (1992), and the
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act ("MERLA"), Minn. Stat. 115B.04,
115B.08 (1991).
Under CERCLA, a federal statute, the costs of cleaning up a
polluted site are allocated among
the responsible parties. If a party
pays more than its fair share, it can
sue other responsible parties for
the difference. CERCLA also authorizes the award of attorney fees
to the winning party in such an
action. MERLA provides for essentially the same actions under
Minnesota state law.
District Court Awards Full
Cleanup Costs
The jury found that Union had
made material misrepresentations
about the condition of the site in
order to induce Gopher to purchase it. The jury also found Union
100 percent responsible for the
cleanup costs imposed under CERCLA. The district court awarded

Gopher the amount of its past
cleanup costs, plus interest and
more than $500,000 in attorney
fees.
Under Minnesota law, out-ofpocket loss is the difference between the actual value of the property Gopher received and the purchase price Gopher paid for it, in
addition to any damages caused by
the fraud. The district court reasoned that the cleanup activities
would increase the value of the
property. Therefore, the district
court judge decided to determine
out-of-pocket damages by calculating the difference between the purchase price and the value of the
property after the cleanup. The
judge decided to wait until the site
was cleaned and revalued before
determining Gopher's out-ofpocket loss.
Union moved for a new trial
which the district court denied.
Union appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit both
the denial of a new trial as well as
the judgment imposing CERCLA
liability and the award of attorney
fees. Gopher appealed the district
court's decision to defer calculation of the damages under the
fraud claim until after completion
of the cleanup.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Occurred
Union argued that the "as is"
clause in the purchase agreement
and Gopher's experience in the
industry conferred upon Gopher a
duty to investigate the property
before purchasing it. Therefore,
Gopher's evidence of fraud, which
consisted of testimony that Union
had assured Gopher the site was
pollution free, was not substantial
enough to support the jury's verdict. The appellate court upheld
the district court's decision because the evidence showed that
Union knew of the pollution and
had tried to conceal it from Gopher. Additionally, Gopher had
relied upon these misrepresentations when purchasing the property.
With regard to the common law
fraud claim, Union argued that no
law allows for recovery of attorney
fees in this type of common law
action. The court of appeals
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agreed, stating that the fraud claim
was separate from the CERCLA
claim. The court therefore remanded the attorney fee award for reduction by the amount apportioned to the fraud claim.
Gopher appealed the district
court's deferral of the damages
award. Gopher argued that this
retention of jurisdiction was erroneous under Minnesota law and
also violated its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the
issue of damages. The court of
appeals held that the district court
was correct in allowing out-ofpocket damages. However, the calculation of the damages should not
have been postponed until the
cleanup was substantially complete. Instead, the award should
have been made promptly by using
expert testimony to estimate the
value of the property upon completion of cleanup.
Union Fully Responsible For
CERCLA Cleanup Costs
On the CERCLA claim, Union
contended that the "as is" clause of
the purchase agreement transferred liability for the cleanup
from Union to Gopher. Additionally, Union argued that CERCLA
allows apportionment of liability
among all responsible parties,
therefore the apportionment of the
full cleanup liability to Union was
unfair.
The court of appeals upheld the
district court's decision, stating
that the allocation of liability under CERCLA is an equitable determination made by the district
court's factual findings and legal
conclusions. The evidence showed
that Union knew of and was responsible for the extensive, toxic
pollution. In addition, the district
court had found that Gopher had
not materially contributed to the
pollution and had no knowledge of
the pollution until an investigation
was ordered by the Authority. The
appellate court held that because
Gopher was fraudulently induced
into entering into the purchase
agreement, the "as is" clause was
invalid and did not serve to transfer liability to Gopher.
The court of appeals also disagreed with Union's contention
that Gopher should not have reVolume 4 Number 4/Fall, 1992

covered attorney fees for the CERCLA claim. Quoting the statutory
language in both CERCLA and
MERLA that expressly allows the
awarding of attorney fees to the
prevailing party, the court of appeals found the district court's
decision appropriate to the extent
that the attorney fees awarded to
Gopher were applied to the CERCLA claim and not to the fraud
claim.
Monica A. Murray

Eleventh Circuit Finds
That All Relevant
Circumstances Must Be
Considered Before
Voiding A Foreclosure
Sale
In Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d
1440 (11 th Cir. 1992), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that before a
court can revoke a residential foreclosure sale, it must be persuaded
that the foreclosure sale price was
not the reasonably equivalent value of the property. However, in
this case, the record lacked specific
facts regarding the circumstances
of the foreclosure sale, so the court
of appeals remanded the case back
to the lower court.
Background
In 1971, Johnny Grissom
("Grissom") took out an $18,000
home loan from Citizens and
Southern National Bank ("C&S")
and secured the loan with his residence. Subsequently, Grissom defaulted. After C&S notified Grissom about the bank's intention to
foreclose on his home, the bank
advertised the foreclosure sale
once a week for four weeks. On
April 4, 1989, the property was
sold to Birnet Johnson ("Johnson") for $14,059, the amount
Grissom owed on the note to C&S.
One day after this sale, Grissom
and his wife filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection. One month
later, they filed a complaint in the
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Georgia seeking to revoke the foreclosure sale.

Lower Courts Void
Foreclosure Sale
In bankruptcy court, Grissom
argued that under federal bankruptcy law, the foreclosure sale
should be nullified. The court
agreed and found that the only
substantial question was whether
the sale price of $14,059 was a
reasonably equivalent value of the
Grissom residence. The court relied upon the "Durrett 70% Rule",
set forth by a prior Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980), which established that in
order to meet the reasonable
equivalency standard, a property
must be sold during a foreclosure
sale for at least 70 percent of its
actual market price.
The bankruptcy court found
that the sale price was less than
$26,000, 70 percent of the property's market value. Since the sale
did not meet the Durrett Rule, the
bankruptcy court ruled that the
foreclosure sale was void. C&S
appealed this decision to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia.
The district court also relied
upon the Durrett dictum and affirmed the order of the bankruptcy
court. The district court mechanically analyzed the issue of reasonably equivalent value and held that
the bankruptcy court correctly followed the general rule that a sale
for less than 70 percent of the fair
market value is less than a reasonably equivalent value. C&S appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Eleventh Circuit Reverses, Using
Totality of Circumstances Rule
On appeal, C&S argued that
both the bankruptcy court and
district court relied too heavily on
the Durrett test while ignoring other potentially relevant factors. The
Eleventh Circuit agreed and rejected the lower courts' dependence on
the Durrett test. In doing so, the
court relied on its recent decision
that a determination of reasonable
equivalency requires a consideration and analysis of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding a
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